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In the mid-19th century, both the laws of mechanics and thermodynamics were known, and both
appeared fundamental. This was changed by Boltzmann and Gibbs, who showed that thermody-
namics can be derived, by applying mechanics to very large systems, and making simple statistical
assumptions about their behavior. Similarly, when Quantum Mechanics (QM) was first discovered,
it appeared to require two sets of postulates: one about the deterministic evolution of wavefunc-
tions, and another about the probabilistic measurement process. Here again, the latter is derivable
from the former: by applying unitary evolution to large systems (apparatuses, observers and envi-
ronment), and making simple assumptions about their behavior, one can derive all the features of
quantum measurement. We set out to demonstrate this claim, using a simple and explicit model of
a quantum experiment, which we hope will be clear and compelling to the average physicist.
I. LEVELS OF UNDERSTANDING
In this paper, we claim that the so-called “quantum
foundations” literature has in fact made progress on the
foundations of QM. This is contrary to the message that
the field itself is broadcasting, and to its perception
among general physicists. To understand our claim of
progress and its contentiousness, it is useful to compare
the situation with that in thermodynamics.
In thermodynamics, we can discern three levels of
understanding. Level 1 is that of Carnot: knowing
the concepts of temperature, heat and entropy, and the
equations that govern them, but lacking any underly-
ing microscopic picture. Level 2 is that of Gibbs and
Boltzmann: deriving all the details of thermodynamics
by (a) recognizing that a thermal system is governed
by mechanics with very many degrees of freedom, (b)
making some simple statistical assumptions about this
mechanical system, and (c) identifying certain statisti-
cal/mechanical quantities with e.g. temperature and en-
tropy. Level 3 is then to justify the statistical assump-
tions of Level 2, i.e. to explain why thermal equilibrium
is in fact such a ubiquitous phenomenon. This has re-
mained a difficult problem for over a century, with only
partial progress so far.
In the QM story, the analog of mechanics is the (de-
terministic) picture of Hilbert spaces, wavefunctions and
unitary evolution. The analog of thermodynamics is
the (probabilistic) postulates describing the outcomes of
measurements. The latter can be summarized as:
A. An observable property of a quantum system is rep-
resented by a Hermitian operator.




C. For a system prepared in a state |ψ〉, an eigen-
value λ will be observed with probability 〈ψ|P̂λ|ψ〉,
where P̂λ is the projector onto the corresponding
eigenspace.
D. Afterwards, the system appears to “collapse” into
the observed eigenspace, such that the state |ψ〉 is
replaced by a normalized multiple of P̂λ|ψ〉.
The fathers of QM, like those of thermodynamics, were at
Level 1: they discovered these rules, but couldn’t derive
them from more fundamental principles. Most modern
textbooks stick to Level 1 as well. Reaching the higher
levels has been the job of the “quantum foundations”
community. Unfortunately, this community’s bar for con-
sensus is somewhere at Level 3: Boltzmann would never
have passed it. As a (somewhat extreme) case in point,
see [1], which literally criticizes some work for being as
flawed as Boltzmann’s understanding of the Second Law.
The claim of this paper is that the understanding of
quantum measurement is now at Level 2: that the above
four postulates can be derived by applying wavefunc-
tions and unitary evolution to the relevant macroscopic
systems, with some simple assumptions about these sys-
tems’ behavior, and some rules for relating the formalism
to reality (of course, for the exercise to be meaningful,
these need to be more basic than Postulates A-D them-
selves). As with statistical mechanics, our assumptions
will appear quite plausible and innocent, but lead to sur-
prisingly strong conclusions when taken seriously. On the
other hand, we make no attempt to justify them rigor-
ously: Level 3 remains distant.
All of the building blocks in our construction are in the
published literature. Some date to the 1980’s [2–4], oth-
ers to the 2000’s [5, 6]. For treatments of some aspects
on a more sophisticated level, see e.g. [7–9]. For an espe-




We model a quantum experiment as a closed quan-
tum system, with a Hilbert space H and a microstate
|Ψ〉 ∈ H, which undergoes unitary time evolution. This
system is composite, i.e. its Hilbert space decomposes
as H = ⊗iH(i), where H(i) are the Hilbert spaces of
subsystems. The latter come in three kinds: microsys-
tems s, with low-dimensional Hilbert spaces H(s), whose
quantum states we wish to measure; macrosystems S,
such as measuring apparatuses and grad students ; and fi-
nally, the environment E . The Hilbert spaces H(S),H(E)
of macrosystems S and the environment E are very high-
dimensional. As a result, almost any two vectors inside
them are almost completely orthogonal.
The detailed microstates of the environment and
macrosystems are, in practice, inaccessible. Instead,
what we observe are certain macrostates γ of the
macrosystems S. These need to satisfy some physical
requirements. First, they must be stable under the un-
avoidable interactions between S and the environment
E . Second, we should be able to view a collection of
macrosystems (S1, . . . , Sk) as one composite macrosys-
tem, with joint macrostates (γ1, . . . , γk). Somehow, these
properties need to be modeled within the Hilbert-space
framework. We adopt the following simple model.
Macrostate axiom. A macrostate γ of a macrosystem
S is defined by a subspace H(S)γ ⊂ H(S), whose dimension
is still very large, but much smaller than that of H(S). A
joint macrostate (γ1, . . . , γk) of a composite macrosystem





The stability of macrostates under interactions with the
environment is encoded in the time-evolution rule:
H(S)γ ⊗H(E) 7−→ H(S)γ ⊗H(E) . (1)
The notation here indicates that states in the LHS Hilbert
space evolve into states in the RHS Hilbert space (in
this case, the same space). We say that macrosystem
S realizes macrostate γ, if the total microstate |Ψ〉 ∈
H(S) ⊗ Hrest (where Hrest denotes the Hilbert space of
all other subsystems) satisfies |Ψ〉 ∈ H(S)γ ⊗ Hrest. Sim-
ilarly, if |Ψ〉 will satisfy this condition in the future, we
say that the γ is predicted.
Let us now make a few comments. First, the sub-
spaces H(S)γ for different macrostates γ are almost com-
pletely orthogonal to each other. This isn’t an assump-
tion, but a generic property of relatively small subspaces
in a very high-dimensional space H(S). Second, while an
interaction of the form (1) preserves the product space
H(S)γ ⊗ H(E), it can of course change (and will typically
increase) the entaglement between S and E : in particu-
lar, product states |S〉⊗|E〉 will not be preserved. Third,
note that we only defined here deterministic predictions.
Of course, these aren’t always possible, since the mi-
crostate won’t always satisfy |Ψ〉 ∈ H(S)γ ⊗Hrest for some
γ. In particular, we can have a situation in which the
macrostate of some macrosystems S can be predicted,
but not that of others. Finally, since this is physics, we
must acknowledge that perfect deterministic predictions
are at best an idealization. It’s therefore good to have a
notion of a prediction that becomes deterministic in an
idealized limit :
Refinement to the macrostate axiom. Consider a
series of experiments, labeled by positive integers N .
If the total microstate in each experiment takes the
form |Ψ〉 = |Φ〉 + |χ〉, where |Φ〉 ∈ H(S)γ ⊗ Hrest and
limN→∞ 〈χ|χ〉 = 0, we say that the macrostate γ for
macrosystem S is realized (or predicted) in the limit
N → ∞.
Our final set of assumptions specifies the behavior of
the particular macrosystems in the experiment. A mea-
suring apparatus A is a special kind of macrosystem,
capable of measuring a microsystem s. Specifically, A
has a “ready to measure” macrostate, denoted by ∅, as
well as some macrostates λ which represent various mea-
surement outcomes. The change in A’s macrostate upon
measuring λ is realized by a unitary (i.e. inner-product-







evolution is triggered when A encounters the microsys-
tem s in certain special states |sλ〉 ∈ H(s) (there may
be more than one such state for every λ). All in all, we
assume a time evolution of the form:







for all |A∅〉 ∈ H(A)∅ .
A grad student G is yet another special macrosystem,
capable of drawing conclusions from the measurement
outcomes of apparatuses. Like an apparatus, G has a
“ready to work” macrostate, denoted by ∅, as well as
some “outcome” macrostates (which may be physically
realized e.g. by markings in a lab notebook). G changes
her macrostate upon encountering a set of apparatuses
(A1, . . . , Ak), according to some function f of their mea-
surement outcomes (λ1, . . . , λk). This behavior is cap-


















For our purposes, it will be sufficient to consider boolean-
values functions f .
III. DERIVING THE MEASUREMENT
POSTULATES
We’ll now derive the measurement postulates, as listed
in section I, from the assumptions of section II. In our
derivations, the environment E with its interactions (1)
3
won’t play an active role: its only function is to keep us
reasonably realistic, and to motivate the structure of the
Macrostate Axiom above. In the following, we’ll omit
E and its states for brevity; the reader can verify that
restoring them won’t affect the conclusions.
A. An observable is a Hermitian operator
A Hermitian operator is defined by two elements: a
collection of mutually orthogonal eigenspaces, and an as-
signment of real eigenvalues to these eigenspaces. The
latter is purely cosmetic: measurement outcomes can just
as well be labeled by complex numbers, or by some non-
numeric tokens. Thus, the true content of Postulate A
is: states |sλ〉 of the microsystem s that lead to mea-
surement outcome λ form a subspace of H(s), and these
subspaces are mutually orthogonal. In other words, there
exist projectors P̂λ onto the relevant subspaces of H(s),
which satisfy:
P̂λP̂λ′ = δλλ′ P̂λ . (4)
We can now verify that this indeed follows from the
assumptions of section II. First, consider two states
|sλ〉 , |s̃λ〉 that both lead to the same measurement out-
come λ, in the sense of eq. (2). From the linearity of time
evolution, it follows that any superposition α |sλ〉+β |s̃λ〉
will also satisfy eq. (2). Thus, the states that lead to
measurement outcome λ indeed form a subspace. Next,
consider two states |sλ〉 , |sλ′〉 that lead to different mea-
surement outcomes λ 6= λ′. Let us demonstrate that
these are orthogonal. We restrict attention to a particu-
lar initial state |A∅〉 ∈ H(A)∅ of the apparatus, and denote:
Û
(A)
λ |A∅〉 ≡ |Aλ〉 ; Û
(A)
λ′ |A∅〉 ≡ |Aλ′〉 . (5)
Then the measurement process (2) for s prepared in the
state |sλ〉 or |sλ′〉 reads:
|sλ〉 ⊗ |A∅〉 7−→ |sλ〉 ⊗ |Aλ〉 ;
|sλ′〉 ⊗ |A∅〉 7−→ |sλ′〉 ⊗ |Aλ′ 〉 .
(6)
Since time evolution is unitary, the inner product of the
initial states in (6) should equal that of the final states:
〈sλ|sλ′〉 〈A∅|A∅〉 = 〈sλ|sλ′〉 〈Aλ|Aλ′〉 . (7)
Now, on the LHS, we have 〈A∅|A∅〉 = 1, while on the
RHS, 〈Aλ|Aλ′〉 is almost certainly close to zero, since
H(A)λ and H
(A)
λ′ are almost completely orthogonal. There-
fore, (7) can only hold if 〈sλ|sλ′〉 = 0, as we wanted to
show.
Note that for this derivation, the orthogonality ofH(A)λ
and H(A)λ′ (due to the macroscopic nature of the appara-
tus) isn’t really needed. It’s enough to have |〈Aλ|Aλ′〉| <
1, which merely requires that the states |Aλ〉 , |Aλ′〉 do
not coincide. Thus, Postulate A is a robust consequence
of any interaction of the form (6), in which the “measur-
ing apparatus” can be just another microscopic system
[6]. The orthogonality of H(A)λ ,H
(A)
λ′ will become impor-
tant later, in our derivation of Postulate D.
B. We always observe one of the eigenvalues
Consider a microsystem s prepared in a superposition
|ψ〉 ∈ |1〉 ⊕ |2〉 of two states |1〉 , |2〉 that lead to mea-
surement outcomes 1,2 by an apparatus A. Postulate B
states that “the measurement will always yield one of the
outcomes 1,2”. To evaluate this claim, we will employ a
grad student G. Her job is to observe the apparatus, and
mark in her notebook which of the following two state-
ments is true:
• Postulate B is true: the apparatus’ needle is point-
ing at one of the allowed values 1,2.
• Postulate B is false: the apparatus’ needle is point-
ing at some intermediate value, or there are sud-
denly two needles pointing at both 1 and 2, or in-
stead of a needle I see a cloud of probability, or
I’ve been thrust out of my ordinary experience into
a psychedelic vision of quantum reality, under the
guidance of a talking cactus.
Let’s label the corresponding macrostates of G as “B-
true” and “B-false”. Now, for s prepared in one of the
two eigenstates |1〉 , |2〉, the time evolution will take the
form:
|1〉 ⊗ H(A)∅ ⊗H
(G)





|2〉 ⊗ H(A)∅ ⊗H
(G)
























Thus, we predict deterministically that G will attest to
seeing one of the outcomes 1,2! The extension to more
than two outcomes is trivial. Obviously, G’s notebook in
this argument can be replaced by any macrosystem that
can evaluate the truth or falsehood of Postulate B, such
as e.g. the mind of a postdoc at the same lab.
C. The Born rule for probabilities
Consider again a microsystem s prepared in a state
|ψ〉, to be measured by an apparatus A. For simplic-
ity, assume only two possible measurement outcomes
1,2. We can then decompose |ψ〉 into the correspond-
ing eigenspaces, as:
|ψ〉 = P̂1|ψ〉+ P̂2|ψ〉 . (10)
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The norm-squared of these two terms is respectively p
and 1− p, where we denote:
p ≡ 〈ψ|P̂1|ψ〉 . (11)
The statement of Postulate C is that p is the probability
for observing outcome 1. This simply means that, if we
repeat the experiment N times, the relative frequency
of outcome 1 will tend to the predicted probability p in
the limit N → ∞. This is a prediction that becomes
deterministic in a limit, as anticipated in the “refined
Macrostate Axiom” of section II.
Let’s make the construction explicit. Consider an ex-
periment with N copies of s, all prepared in the state
|ψ〉. These are measured by N copies of the apparatus
A. To avoid the complications of a continuum limit, we
fix some finite error margin ε > 0 for the outcomes’ rel-
ative frequencies. We then assign a grad student G to
evaluate the measurement outcomes (λ1, . . . , λN ) of the
N apparatuses, as in eq. (3). The grad student’s func-
tion f decides whether PostulateC is satisfied, according
to:












where m is the number of “1” outcomes among








This is a sum of 2N terms, all orthogonal to each other.
The norm-squared of each term is pm(1− p)N−m, where
m represents the number of P̂1|ψ〉 factors in the prod-
uct, and N − m is the number of P̂2|ψ〉 factors. The






time evolution is unitary, the 2N terms will retain their
norms and orthogonality throughout the experiment. Af-











After evaluation (3) by the grad student, the state evolves
into |Ψ′′〉 = |Φ〉 + |χ〉, where we grouped the 2N terms










Let’s now evaluate the norm of |χ〉. Tallying the norm-
squared of the orthogonal terms that contribute to it,



















Thus, in the N → ∞ limit, |χ〉 vanishes in the sense of
the Hilbert-space norm. We can therefore predict deter-
ministically that the grad student’s notebook will read
“C-true”, confirming the Born rule. Again, the general-
ization to more than two outcomes is trivial.
D. Apparent collapse
Consider again the microsystem s in a state |ψ〉, mea-
sured by A with two possible outcomes 1, 2, with corre-
sponding projectors P̂1, P̂2 on H(s). What does it mean
to say that “upon measuring outcome 1, the state of s
collapses into a normalized multiple of P̂1|ψ〉”? It can
only mean that the outcome of all subsequent measure-
ments will be as if such a collapse occurred. Consider,
then, a second measurement by apparatus B, with two
possible outcomes α, β associated with projectors P̂α, P̂β
(the interesting case is of course when P̂α, P̂β don’t com-
mute with P̂1, P̂2). The statement of Postulate D is then
that the probability of the sequence of outcomes (1, α) is
equal to the probability of outcome 1 for s prepared in the
state |ψ〉, times the probability of outcome α for s pre-
pared in the state P̂1|ψ〉√
〈ψ|P̂1|ψ〉
, i.e. in a normalized multiple
of P̂1|ψ〉. By Postulate C, these latter probabilities are
〈ψ|P̂1|ψ〉 and 〈ψ|P̂1P̂αP̂1|ψ〉〈ψ|P̂1|ψ〉 , respectively. Thus, the state-
ment of Postulate D simplifies into: the probability of the
sequence of outcomes (1, α) is 〈ψ|P̂1P̂αP̂1|ψ〉. We can
now easily verify that this is in fact true, by extending
the method of section III C.
The process of measuring s, first by A and then by B,
leads to a sum of 4 terms, labeled by the measurement
outcomes λ = 1, 2 and ξ = α, β:






















The norm-squared of each term is 〈ψ|P̂λP̂ξP̂λ|ψ〉. The
vectors P̂ξP̂λ|ψ〉 are orthogonal to each other for different
ξ, but not for different λ; however, due to the orthogo-
nality of the subspaces H(A)λ , the 4 terms in (16) are or-
thogonal overall. Now, consider N copies of the (s, A,B)
setup, each undergoing the process (16), leading to 4N
orthogonal terms overall. We can now add in a graduate
student, tasked as in (12) with evaluating whether the
relative frequency of the outcome sequence (1, α) agrees
with the corresponding norm-squared 〈ψ|P̂1P̂αP̂1|ψ〉, up
to some accuracy ε. From here, the argument is identical
to that in section III C. In the N → ∞ limit, the student
will deterministically conclude that the relative frequency
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